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11 Introduction
In the period June 3-13, 2004, the Danish Customs and Tax carried out a
series of control operations vis-a-vis a number of ﬁrms in several service sec-
tors.1 Most actions involved pizzerias, restaurants, and taxi companies, but
a whole range of service sectors was covered. Tax evasion proved to be per-
vasive. For instance, among 678 pizzerias and restaurants inspected, 40 pct.
had ”messed-up accounts”, i.e., incomplete registration of earnings. Further,
of 1,846 employees in these ﬁrms, more than half were not registered, and
of these no less than a third claimed to have their ”ﬁrst working day” in
the ﬁrm, this being the reason for lacking registration of their employment.
Later raids by the tax authorities conﬁrm that under-reporting of income of
workers is a wide-spread phenomenon in many service sectors, and a testi-
mony of the importance of under-reporting is that the Ministry of Taxation
in Denmark has made so-called ’Fair Play’, i.e. truthful reporting of income
earned and wages paid in all sectors, a top priority.
Under-reporting of income is of course not only a Danish phenomenon,
but a problem for tax systems in all countries. For the tax evaders involved,
under-reporting can have dire consequences. When ﬁrms refraining from
paying social security taxes and from withholding income tax on behalf of
their employees are detected, then the taxes due have to be paid, and on top
of this both employer and employee can be ﬁned or even imprisoned.
On a wider scale, the scope for under-reporting of income and the prob-
ability of being detected are likely to inﬂuence the working of labor markets
and in particular the level of wages and the rate of unemployment. Firms
and workers may agree to report only part of the remuneration of labor as
oﬃcial wage, paying the remainder of the remuneration as an unoﬃcial and
unreported wage component. Thereby, they save on social security taxes
and personal income taxes, but face the risk of being detected with resulting
ﬁnes.
This paper aims to shed light on the link between opportunities for under-
1Description of the control operations and of the sanctions associated with diﬀerent
forms of tax evasion is available at www.skat.dk.
2reporting of labor income on one hand and wage level and unemployment rate
on the other. To this aim we apply a matching model of a well-deﬁned labor
market. A ﬁxed number of workers are in the labor market, while ﬁrms enter
this part of the economy, when it is proﬁtable to do so. Firms post vacant
positions, and they attempt to match with unemployed workers which have
been separated from previous employment. Once they are matched, they
bargain over both the oﬃcial wage and over the unoﬃcial wage. The wage
bargain will take into account tax rates as well as tax enforcement policy on
the part of authorities. With wages set, labor market tightness and therefore
the rate of unemployment of workers are determined.
Higher taxes are normally associated with higher, or unchanged, unem-
ployment in labor markets. In our framework we ﬁnd, perhaps contrary to
expectations, that a higher rate of tax, whether pay-roll or personal income
tax, actually reduces unemployment. An increase in the tax rate will increase
the value of tax evasion via under-reporting of income. This in turn raises
the value of employment to unemployment, as evasion is open only to em-
ployed workers. The result is restrained wage demands, so that more ﬁrms
will open vacancies. With the number of vacancies relative to the number of
job seekers rising, unemployment falls.
Less frequent auditing of ﬁrms and workers, or lower ﬁne rates, also re-
duces unemployment in our model. Since under-reporting of income again is
available only to employed workers, less frequent auditing or lower punish-
ment of evasion likewise increase the value of employment relative to unem-
ployment. The result is restrained wage demands, and more ﬁrms will ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to open vacancies. With the number of vacancies relative to the
number of job seekers rising, unemployment falls.
Thus, both higher tax rates and more lenient enforcement of taxes can in
principle be used in our matching framework as instruments to increase the
incentives for employment and work.
We derive our results in a basic version of the model. Then we go on
to show that extending the model by incorporating several formulations of
unemployment beneﬁts; separation of workers and ﬁrms upon detection of
tax evasion; and taxation of company income does not alter our main insights.
3The literature on tax evasion has grown to become rather large.2 The
early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where under-reporting of income by
an individual is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent
papers have since then enhanced the basic model of individual behaviour
by, for example, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions.3 Also,
general equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed; for an
example featuring commodity taxation see Cremer and Gahvari (1993).
Our paper diﬀers from the ﬁrst wave of articles on tax evasion, in that
we incorporate an imperfectly functioning labour market. This facilitates
an analysis of how tax and enforcement policies aﬀect wage setting and un-
employment. As the previous research takes wages to be either exogenous
or determined by market clearing, such a framework will clearly not enable
any examination of how involuntary unemployment is aﬀected by tax and
enforcement policies.
Moreover, one may note that the public ﬁnance approach to tax evasion
issues has switched focus from the individual’s decision on the extent of
evasion of income tax (as in Allingham and Sandmo) towards a modeling
strategy where ﬁrms under-report their true proﬁts, sales or wages paid.
This trend reﬂects that the institutional setting has changed. When auditing
individual tax returns, tax authorities have access to reports on income paid
by companies to their employees; hence, it is nearly impossible for individuals
to misreport the wages and salaries paid to them.4 Our modeling strategy,
where the employer and the employee together agree on the amount of income
to report to the tax authorities, more closely corresponds to the institutional
setting in industrialized economies today. Further, our apporach enables us
to shed new light on under-reporting of labour income.
R e c e n ty e a r sh a v es e e ns o m es t u d i e sof underground activity in models
2See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two surveys of
tax avoidence and tax evasion.
3See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of en-
dogenous labour supply and under-reporting of income.
4Even capital income is becoming intrinsically more diﬃcult to under-report.
4of involuntary unemployment; see Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2003), Cavalcanti
(2002), Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), and Fugazza and Jacques (2004). These
papers, however, do not focus on under-reporting of income; instead, they
are exclusively concerned with the activity in the underground economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and
examines how wages and unemployment are aﬀected by tax evasion as well
as by the tax and enforcement system. Section 3 considers some extensions
of the basic model to take account of unemployment beneﬁts; cessation of
the worker-ﬁrm relationship upon detection of tax evasion; and other taxes
on ﬁrms. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The model we employ to study the relation between tax evasion and enforce-
ment, wage formation, and unemployment is an equilibrium model of the
labor market. The labour market is characterized by trading frictions due to
costly and time-consuming matching of workers and ﬁrms.5
Firms ﬁle reports to the tax authorities regarding the amount of income
they have paid out to their employees. This oﬃcially reported income serves
as the basis for income taxes on workers and payroll taxes on ﬁrms. In addi-
tion, workers may earn income which is not reported to the tax authorities,
as workers and ﬁrms are able to evade taxes by agreeing on an amount of
income that goes unreported.
Tax authorities initially undertake a costless scanning of reported incomes
in the economy. Unless workers and ﬁrms have spent resources in order to
conceal unreported income, they will be immediately revealed as tax cheaters
by the authorities. In addition, tax authorities audit a fraction of ﬁrms in the
economy which are selected randomly among all ﬁr m st h a tw e r en o tr e v e a l e d
as tax cheaters by the initial scanning procedure. These audits are costly,
but do reveal the true compensation paid to workers.6
5The core of our model corresponds to that in the basic model in Pissarides (2000).
6See Cremer and Gahvari (1993) among others for a similar assumption of an initial
scanning procedure and concealment costs.
5With a certain probability a worker-ﬁrm pair is targeted by an audit,
after which either party has to pay a fee. No ﬁrm will choose to under-report
without at the same time spending resources to conceal this, as otherwise
they surely will be detected in the scanning procedure.
2.1 Matching
The economy consists of a large number of risk neutral individuals. Without
loss of generality, we normalize this number to unity. Individuals are either
employed or unemployed. Employed workers are separated from their jobs
at the exogenous separation rate s. In our basic model we assume that if
at a x - e v a d i n gw o r k e r - ﬁrm pair is detected, they may nevertheless continue
their relationship.7
The matching process is captured by a concave, constant-returns-to-scale
matching function, H = h(v,u),w h e r ev is the number of vacancies supplied
by ﬁrms, and u is the number of unemployed workers searching for a job. As
the labour force is normalized to unity, the number of unemployed workers
and the number of vacancies are also the unemployment rate and the vacancy
rate, respectively. The rate at which an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job is
given by H/u = h(θ,1) = λ(θ),w h e r eθ = v/u captures labour market tight-
ness. Firms ﬁll vacancies at the rate H/v = h(1,1/θ)=q(θ). Consequently,
we have λ(θ)=θq(θ),w h e r eλ0 (θ) > 0 and q0 (θ) < 0 .H i g h e r l a b o u r
market tightness θ increases workers’ chance of ﬁnding a job, but reduces the
likelihood of a ﬁrm ﬁn d i n gaw o r k e r .
Equating the ﬂows out of unemployment to the number of destroyed jobs





which depends positively on the separation rate and negatively on tightness.
7In an extension in section 3 we consider the case where the match is dissolved upon
detection of tax evasion. As will be made clear there, our results are only reinforced by
assuming termination of the worker-ﬁrm relationship upon detection.
62.2 Workers and Firms
Let E and U represent the expected discounted value of employment and
unemployment, respectively. The values of employment in a particular ﬁrm,
i, and unemployment can be written in the following form:
rEi = T + w
o
i (1 − t)+w
e
i (1 − pδ) − C (w
e
i) − s(Ei − U), (2)
rU = T + λ(E − U), (3)
where wo is the oﬃcially reported wage, and we is the amount of a worker’s
remuneration which is not reported to the tax authorities. T is a lump sum
transfer received by all individuals; r the exogenous discount rate; t the pro-
portional income tax rate; p the probability of being detected as withholding
tax payments from the government; and δ the proportion of evaded income
the worker has to pay as a ﬁne if detected.8 C (we) captures concealment
costs of a worker related to withholding income from tax authorities, where
C0 (we), C00 (we) > 0, C (0) = C0 (0) = 0. For simplicity, we assume that
unemployment beneﬁts are equal to zero initially; in section 3 we discuss the
case of positive unemployment beneﬁts.
Let J and V denote the expected present values of an occupied and
a vacant job, respectively. The asset equations of a speciﬁco c c u p i e dj o b ,
referred to by the subscript i, and a vacant job, can be written as:
rJi = y − w
o
i (1 + z) − w
e
i (1 + pα) − G(w
e
i) − s(Ji − V ), (4)
rV = −k + q(J − V ), (5)
where y is worker productivity, z denotes the payroll tax rate, α is the pro-
portion of the evaded wage the ﬁrm has to pay as a ﬁne if detected, and k
is the cost of vacancy. G(we) captures the concealment costs facing a ﬁrm,
where G0 (we), G00(we) > 0, G(0) = G0 (0) = 0. As will become clear, it is of
no importance for the results whether concealment costs are mainly carried
by the worker or by the ﬁrm.
8As the setting of our model is in continous time, p is actually an intensity variable
rather than a true probability level. Nevertheless, we shall often refer to p as a probability,
and somewhat loosely one may think of p as the likelihood of detection within one time
unit.
72.3 Wage Determination
When a worker and a ﬁrm meet, they bargain over the oﬃcial wage, wo,a s
well as over the unoﬃcial payment, we.
Formally we solve the wage bargaining problem by maximizing the Nash
Product with respect to wo
i and we
i. The Nash Product representing a par-
ticular match, i, is written as Ωi = β ln(Ei − U)+(1− β)ln(Ji − V ),w h e r e
β captures workers’ relative bargaining power.
In a symmetric equilibrium, wo
i = wo and we
i = we, and under the as-










J = E − U, (7)
where φo =( 1+z)/(1 − t) and φe(we)=( 1+pα + G0 (we))/(1 − pδ − C0 (we))
are the tax and punishment wedges. Solving for the bargained oﬃcial and






T h ea m o u n to fe v a d e di n c o m ei sc h o s e ns ot h a tt h et a xa n dﬁne wedges
a r ee q u a l i z e d . W en o t ef r o m( 8 ) ,u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions of the wedges, that
there is no evasion if the expected punishment rates are greater than or equal
to the tax rates, or more speciﬁcally if (1 + pα)/(1 − pδ) ≥ (1 + z)/(1 − t).
With (1 + pα)/(1 − pδ) < (1 + z)/(1 − t), on the other hand, it is always
optimal for the workers and the ﬁrms to agree on, at least some, evasion,
we > 0. We will concentrate on the case where there is an interior solution
with tax evasion, we > 0,a n dw h e r ei ti sn o to p t i m a lf o rt h et w op a r t i e s
to evade all of the income, wo > 0. This implies that we speciﬁcally as-
sume (1 + pα)/(1 − pδ) < (1 + z)/(1 − t) and that the concealment cost
9An additional ﬁrm will, of course, ﬁnd itself in idle position to begin with. For entry
to be just (un)proﬁtable, V has to equal zero.
8functions are suﬃciently convex.10
The condition in (8) is intuitive, since if φo >φ e the total surplus of the
match can be increased by raising the amount of evaded income for a given
level of total compensation. Analogously, it would be preferable for both
parties to reduce the amount of tax evasion, if φo <φ e.
It follows from this discussion that the amount of evaded income is in our
framework aﬀected only by parameters in the tax and enforcement system
and not by labour market conditions or bargaining power. From this we can
conclude the straight forward implication that:
Proposition 1 Increased taxation, i.e. an increase in t or z ,i n c r e a s e st h e
amount of under-reported income, whereas a stronger enforcement, i.e. an
increase in p, α,o rδ, reduces the amount of under-reported income.
Proof Diﬀerentiate (8) with respect to we,z,t,p,α,δ.
Whereas labour market conditions and bargaining power do not have any
direct impact on the amount of under-reported income, they will, however,
aﬀect the total amount of compensation for work. Given the evaded income
which is determined in (8), we can derive the bargained per-period expected
producer costs facing an average ﬁrm using equation (6) or (7). This yields:
w
o (1 + z)+w
e (1 + pα)+G = β (y + kθ) − (1 − β)ϕ, (9)
where ϕ = φowe (1 − pδ) − φoC − we (1 + pα) − G ≥ 0.T h ep a r a m e t e rϕ in
a sense measures the surplus associated with tax evasion; it is positive due
to the properties of the concealment cost function.11
In the absence of tax evasion opportunities, the free entry condition dic-
tates that the gross wage, wo(1 + z), which then is total producer cost, will
equal β(y + θk).T h e s u m (y + kθ) then stands for the surplus associated
with a successful match between a worker and a ﬁrm. The share β of the
surplus accrues to the worker. However, when it is possible to evade taxes,
10We have assumed above that both C(.) and G(.) are strictly convex functions. Strictly
speaking, it suﬃces that one of them is, while the other is linear or even degenerate (equal
to zero).
11C0 >C / w e,G 0 >G / w e. Hence, ϕ =0only when there is no income tax evasion.
9doing it to the optimal extent reduces producer cost for a given tightness in
line with (9). Gross cost savings due to tax evasion amount to (1 − β)ϕ.
We note that a change in the amount of unreported income, we,h a sn o
eﬀect on expected producer costs for given tightness.12 Hence, a marginal
increase in unreported income reduces oﬃcial wage demands to such extent
that expected producer costs of ﬁrms are left unaﬀected.
2.4 Tightness and the oﬃcial wage
Labour market tightness is derived from equations (4) and (5), using the free
entry condition V =0 , and the expression for producer costs (9):
(r + s)k
q(θ)
=( 1− β)y − βkθ+( 1− β)ϕ, (10)
w h e r ew er e c a l lt h a tϕ is pinned down by parameters from the tax and
punishment system as well as by the concealment cost functions; see the
deﬁnition of ϕ a n d( 8 ) .T h u s( 1 0 )y i e l d sau n i q u es o l u t i o nf o rθ.
Finally, with the unoﬃcial wage component we and tightness θ now de-
rived, the oﬃcial wage wo can easily be derived from the expression for user
cost in (9). It is worth noting that in the absence of tax evasion opportu-
nities, wo is simply given by wo = β(y + kθ)/(1 + z); with tax evasion, the
oﬃcial wage will naturally be reduced.
2.5 Taxes, Enforcement, and Unemployment
We are now ready to draw conclusions about the relationship between tax
evasion and unemployment, and about the impact of tax and enforcement
policies on unemployment. Starting with the relationship between tax eva-
sion and unemployment we can conclude the following:
Proposition 2 Let the expected punishment rates be lower than the tax rates
in the sense that φo >φ e(0). Then unemployment will fall, if workers and
ﬁrms agree on tax evasion.
12Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of (9) with respect to we yields (1−pδ −C0)(φo −
φe(we)) which is zero for the optimal choice of we.
10Proof With (1 + pα)/(1 − pδ) < (1 + z)/(1 − t), ﬁrms and workers will
proﬁt from tax evasion, i.e. we > 0 is agreed upon. No under-reporting of
income, we =0 , implies that ϕ =0 . From (10) it follows that θ is larger
when we > 0 is agreed upon, since then ϕ>0. And from (1) it follows that
unemployment falls with θ.
The intuition is straight-forward. As under-reporting of income is avail-
able only to employed workers, enabling tax evasion in eﬀect becomes an in-
strument to increase the incentive to work. The ability to evade taxes when
employed increases the value of employment relative to unemployment, in-
ducing wage moderation. Wage moderation in turn induces more ﬁrms to
post vacancies, lowering unemployment.
Clearly, workers become more keen on getting access to these tax evasion
opportunities the higher the tax rates are and the less severely tax evasion
is controlled and punished by the government. Thus, the higher are the tax
rates and the less strong is the government control of tax evasion, the more
willing are workers to accept lower wages in order to avoid unemployment.
That is, ϕ in (9) is larger the higher are t and z and the lower are p, α,a n d
δ.
As under-reporting of income is open only to employed workers, thereby
serving as a side-beneﬁt to employement, the tax evasion opportunities closely
resemble the workings of various kinds of ’in work beneﬁts’. Examples of such
in-work beneﬁts are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and
the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the UK. Fringe beneﬁts which accrue to
employed workers only, induce similar outcomes, too.
The government can, of course, not directly control the amount of under-
reporting of income by ﬁrms and workers. But it can aﬀect how attractive
tax evasion appears by its choice of tax rates and the parameters of the
enforcement system. We conclude:
Proposition 3 In case workers and ﬁrms evade taxes, we > 0,i n c r e a s e d
taxation, i.e. an increase in t or z , reduces unemployment whereas a stronger
enforcement, i.e. an increase in p, α,o rδ, raises unemployment.
11Proof Diﬀerentiating (10) yields ∂θ/∂x1 < 0, and ∂θ/∂x2 > 0, x1 =
p,α,δ,x2 = t,z. Diﬀerentiating (1) yields ∂u/∂x1 > 0, and ∂u/∂x2 < 0,
x1 = p,α,δ,x2 = t,z.
We thus ﬁnd, perhaps contrary to expectations, that higher tax rates
actually reduces unemployment. The reason is that an increased tax rate
will increase the value of evasion, since evasion implies escaping taxation.
This in turn raises the value of employment relative to unemployment as
evasion is open only to employed workers; wage demands are restrained and
unemployment reduced.
This mechanism becomes even more clear, if we consider the impact
of taxes on unemployment in the absence of opportunities to under-report
labour income. In the absence of under-reporting of income, this model col-
lapses to the basic Pissarides model (Pissarides (2000)), where an increase
in, for example, the payroll tax rate induces wage adjustment which leaves
producer costs and unemployment unaﬀected in equilibrium. When the pay-
roll tax rate increases, ﬁrms will open less vacancies as expected proﬁts falls.
However, as less vacancies are opened it becomes more diﬃcult to get a new
job in case of job loss, and in order to avoid unemployment, wages are re-
strained. In case of no unemployment beneﬁts or of beneﬁts indexed to the
consumer wage, wages are restrained to such extent that the producer wage
a n dt h u su n e m p l o y m e n ti su n a ﬀected in equilibrium.
These mechanisms are also present if we allow for under-reporting of
labour income. However, in the presence of under-reporting there is an addi-
tional eﬀect which induces wage demands to fall further. When the payroll
tax rate increases, it becomes more valuable to under-report income, and
thus more valuable to be employed and have access to these tax evasion op-
portunities. Accordingly, workers become more willing to accept lower wages
in order to avoid unemployment.
For analogous reasons, punishing tax evasion through more frequent au-
diting or higher ﬁnes reduces the attractiveness of tax evasion. As a conse-
quence, wage demands increase, and less ﬁrms will open vacancies; unemploy-
ment rises. Workers are simply less willing to accept low wages as opposed
to unemployment. Conversely, reducing the punishment of tax evasion can
12actually function as an instrument to increase the incentive to work; restrain
wage demands and reduce unemployment.
Introducing the government budget restriction enables us to take a closer
look at the content of proposition 2. The government budget restriction in
per-capita form is given by:
T =( 1− u)[w
o (t + z)+w
ep(α + δ)] − F (p(1 − u)). (11)
The right hand side has the net revenue of the government, i.e. the excess of
revenue from taxation and auditing over the cost of auditing, F (p(1 − u)).
The cost of auditing is written as a function of the number of ﬁrm-worker
relationships inspected. On the left hand side is the resulting lump-sum
transfer T paid to all workers.
Appropriate adjustments in T clearly enable the policy changes in propo-
s i t i o n2t ob ef u l l yﬁnanced. Alternatively, it is possible to keep T unchanged
in a reform by combining a reduced audit rate or reduced ﬁnes with higher
tax rates; such a reform leads to a double reduction in unemployment.13
2 . 6 A na l t e r n a t i v ef o r m u l a t i o no fﬁnes
Our remark above that one would expect the ﬁnes α and δ to be balanced
against punishment of other crimes suggests an alternative formulation of
these ﬁnes. In practice, ﬁnes often consist of both the tax that the worker or
employer attempted to evade in the ﬁrst instance, and a genuine ﬁne normally
expressed as a certain percentage of the tax.14
Hence, a possible alternative formulation of ﬁne parameters could be
δ = at, α = az
13Taking as given that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curve
in the sence that an increase in t, z, α, δ or p does generate higher revenue.
14Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 820) write, for example, that civil penalties typically are
applied at a rate of 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment of tax resulting from
as p e c i ﬁed misconduct; in cases of fraud, a civil penalty may be applied at a rate of 75
percent. In Denmark, tax evasion or cheating is often punished with a payment equal to
200 pct. or more of the tax that originally was avoided, the relevant percentage being
determined by the amount of tax evaded.
13where a would be somewhere between, say, 1 and 3, so that both the original
tax and a ﬁne proportional to the tax would be included in the ﬁne payment
to authorities. The parameter a would be regarded as ﬁxed, whereas the ﬁne
payment — contrary to our formulation above — would vary with changes in
tax rates. Relative to the comparative statics analysis above, there would
be no change in the analysis of altering the auditing probability, p.B u t a
change in either of the two taxes t or z would give rise to additional terms,
as payments upon detection would change in line with the relevant tax rate.
It turns out that as long as the expression 1 − pa − C/we can be taken
as positive, the qualitative results concerning the eﬀects of tax increases on
market tightness and unemployment will be the same as above. While a
positive sign of the expression seems natural, it is not a necessity, though.
In the next section we shall revert to original and simpler formulation of
ﬁnes.
3 Extensions
In this section we look at the implications of several modiﬁcations and ex-
tensions to our framework. In turn, we consider the existence of positive
unemployment beneﬁts; the possibility of separation of workers and ﬁrms
upon detection; and other taxes on ﬁr m ss u c ha st h ec o r p o r a t ei n c o m et a x .
3.1 Positive Beneﬁts
We ﬁr s te x p l o r et h ec o n s e q u e n c e so fh a v i n gp o s i t i v eu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts.
The basic model featured only a common transfer to both employed and un-
employed individuals and no special beneﬁts to the unemployed. Introducing
unemployment beneﬁts implies facing questions as to how these beneﬁts are
determined, and a couple of options are explored below.
The value function for an unemployed worker is now written:
rUi = T + B + λ(Ei − Ui), (12)
14where B denotes the after-tax beneﬁt received when unemployed. The value
functions for employed workers and ﬁrms are still given by (2), (4), and (5).
Accounting for beneﬁts will not inﬂuence the ﬁrst order conditions deter-
mining wages, (6) and (7), with the exception that the term E −U becomes
E −U = 1
r+s+λ (wo (1 − t)+we (1 − pδ) − C (we) − B). Hence, (8) still pins
down the size of unreported income as given by concealment cost functions
and the tax and punishment system. Changes in the unemployment beneﬁt
system will thus not inﬂuence the amount of unreported income.
We explore two natural candidates for the deﬁnition of unemployment
beneﬁts. First, we assume that the pre-tax beneﬁt is indexed to the average
(oﬃcial) wage, i.e., B/(1−t)=ρwo,i m p l y i n ga no ﬃcial constant replacement
rate. Second, we assume that the pre-tax unemployment beneﬁti sﬁxed at
¯ B, so that the after-tax beneﬁtc a nb ew r i t t e nB = ¯ B (1 − t).15
Constant replacement rate
Proceeding with the ﬁrst deﬁnition we can derive the per-period expected
producer costs from (6), keeping in mind that (8) determines the unreported
income, we. This yields:
w
o (1 + z)+w
e (1 + pα)+G =
1
1 − ρ(1 − β)
[β (y + kθ) − (1 − β)ϕ
0], (13)
where ϕ0 = φowe (1 − pδ)−φoC −(1 − ρ)(we (1 + pα)+G) ≥ 0. Comparing
(13) with (9) allows to clarify how positive beneﬁts indexed to the (oﬃcial)
wage aﬀects producer costs and thereby unemployment.
F i r s t ,w en o t et h a tt h es q u a r eb r a c k e t so nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei sm u l t i p l i e d
by 1/(1 − ρ(1 − β)). This has no impact on the qualitative results derived
from the basic model.16 Secondly, and more interesting, we note that ρ
15Note that in both cases unemployment beneﬁts are — realistically — assumed to be sub-
ject to personal income taxation. Alternatively, unemployment beneﬁts might be exempt
from tax.
16This term only ampliﬁes the eﬀect from comparative statics as 1/(1 − ρ(1 − β)) > 1.
An increase in for example y increases wage demands as the workers want to reap a fraction
of the productivity increase. With beneﬁts indexed to the average (oﬃcial) wage, they rise
with the higher oﬃcial wages. As beneﬁts increase, oﬃcial wage demands are increased
further. Thus, the eﬀe c to nw a g e si sa m p l i ﬁed. Analogous reasoning holds for a change in
p, α,o rδ and t or z.
15enters the expression for ϕ0. This implies, in contrast to the basic model,
that the expected producer costs are aﬀected by changes in the amount of
unreported income, we.S p e c i ﬁcally, we have
∂ϕ0
∂we = φo (1 − pδ − C0)ρ>0
for ρ>0. In the basic model with no unemployment beneﬁts, i.e., ρ =0 ,
an increase in unreported income reduced oﬃcial wage demands such that
expected producer costs were unaﬀected. With positive beneﬁts, ρ>0,a n
increase in unreported income will induce oﬃcial wage demands to fall to
such an extent that total expected producer costs actually fall. The reason
is that the reduced oﬃcial wage demands also lower unemployment beneﬁts.
This reduction in unemployment beneﬁts induces wage moderation which
causes total expected producer costs to fall.
We know from proposition 3 that unemployment falls following an in-
crease in t or z or a reduction in p, α,o rδ. In the presence of positive unem-
ployments beneﬁts, unemployment falls for a second reason, since it becomes
optimal to under-report more income. As this causes unemployment beneﬁts
to fall, in turn inducing wage moderation, unemployment drops. Accordingly,
beneﬁts indexed to the (oﬃcial) wage reinforces the eﬀect on unemployment
of a change in p, α or δ and z or t. This insight is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 With unemployment beneﬁts indexed to the oﬃcial wage,
B = ρwo(1 − t), and workers and ﬁrms evading taxes, we > 0,a ni n c r e a s e
in t or z,o rar e d u c t i o ni np, α,o rδ, will induce an additional wage moder-
ating eﬀect, as unemployment beneﬁts fall when workers and ﬁrms increase
the unoﬃcial wage. This additional mechanism will also work to reduce un-
employment.
Proof Diﬀerentiating (13) with respect to the producer costs and we
yields ∂ (wo(1 + z)+we (1 + pα)+G)/∂we < 0.D i ﬀerentiating (10) yields
∂θ/∂we > 0. Finally, diﬀerentiating (1) yields ∂u/∂we = ∂u/∂θ·∂θ/∂we < 0.
Fixed pre-tax beneﬁts
Now let beneﬁts be ﬁxed pre-tax, i.e., B = ¯ B (1 − t), where ¯ B is the pre-
tax unemployment beneﬁt. The per-period expected producer costs derived
16from (6) then take the form:
w
o(1 + z)+w
e (1 + pα)+G = β (y + kθ)+( 1− β) ¯ B (1 + z) − (1 − β)ϕ,
(14)
where again we is determined in (8). This expression reveals that changes in
α, δ and t will work through the same channels as in the basic model.
However, there will be a direct eﬀect on producer costs of a change in
the payroll tax rate, z.A n i n c r e a s e i n z will have a direct positive eﬀect
on producer costs, which goes in the opposite direction to the eﬀect of z
through ϕ (see proposition 2). This direct positive eﬀect on producer costs
is the standard eﬀect found in models of equilibrium unemployment when
beneﬁts are not indexed to the wage (see Pissarides (1998)).17 This implies
that an increase in z will have an ambiguous eﬀect on unemployment in
contrast to the basic model (where B =0 ) or in contrast to the model where
beneﬁts are indexed to the oﬃcial wage (B = ρwo (1 − t)).
P r o p o s i t i o n2h o l d sf o rt h es a m er e a s o na si nt h eb a s i cm o d e l ,w h e np o s -
itive unemployment beneﬁts are accounted for (irrespective of the deﬁnition
of unemployment beneﬁts).
3.2 Separation upon detection
This section explores the consequences of having jobs dissolved upon detec-
tion of tax evasion. The basic model in section 2 implied that the worker-ﬁrm
17It is interesting to note the incidence of the payroll tax and how it varies with the
deﬁnition of unemployment beneﬁts: When there is an increase in the payroll tax, the
producer wage initially increases. However, as ﬁrms will open less vacancies when wage
costs are higher, tightness falls. This reduction in tightness will induce wage moderation,
which in turn reduces wage costs and induces tightness to increase again. Thus the burden
of the payroll tax is also carried by the worker. When beneﬁts are indexed to wages,
beneﬁts will fall as wages are moderated. And as beneﬁts fall, wages are moderated further.
In fact, with beneﬁts being indexed to the wage, the worker will carry the full burden of
the tax, leaving producer cost unaﬀected in equilibrium. However, in the absence of this
indexation of beneﬁts, the burden of the payroll tax rate is shared by both the worker and
the ﬁrm, which causes producer costs to increase in this case.
17relationship would continue even in the situation where their common evasion
of taxes was detected. The alternative hypothesis is that the relationship is
terminated on account of such detection of tax evasion.
With separation upon detection, the value functions for an employed
worker and a ﬁlled vacancy are written:
rEi = T + w
o
i (1 − t)+w
e
i (1 − pδ) − C (w
e
i) − (s + p)(Ei − U), (15)
rJi = y − w
o
i (1 + z) − w
e
i (1 + pα) − G(w
e
i) − (s + p)(Ji − V ), (16)
where s+p now captures the eﬀective separation rate.18 The value functions
for unemployed workers and vacancies are still given by (3) and (5).
Having jobs separated upon detection will not inﬂuence wage bargains.
The evaded wage and the expected producer costs are thus still given by (8)
and (9). Changes in the audit rate, p,w i l la ﬀect the expected producer costs
through its impact on the expected punishment rates (working through ϕ)
as was described in the basic model. However, changes in p will now also
have a direct eﬀect on tightness and unemployment.
The equation determining tightness is given by:
(r + s + p)k
q(θ)
=( 1− β)y − βkθ+( 1− β)ϕ,
where it follows that an increase in p reduces tightness directly by reduc-
ing the expected job duration. As jobs on average last a shorter time when
matches are dissolved upon detection, less ﬁrms will open vacancies. Conse-
quently, an increase in p induces tightness to fall, both because the expected
producer costs increase and because the expected job duration falls.
Equating the ﬂows out of unemployment to the number of destroyed jobs
yields the steady state unemployment rate:
u =
s + p
s + p + λ(θ)
,
w h e r ea ni n c r e a s ei np now has a direct impact on unemployment in addition
to the eﬀect working through tightness. An increase in p increases unem-
ployment directly simply by increasing the rate of separations. In addition,
18Again, although we loosely speak of p as the probability of detection, it really stands
for the intensity of auditing rather than a likelihood.
18an increase in p reduces the proﬁtability of opening vacancies both because
expected producer costs increase and because jobs on average last a shorter
time. As less vacancies are opened, the transition rate into employment falls.
Thus, unemployment increases following an increase in the audit rate both
because the transition rate into employment falls and because the transi-
tion rate out of employment increases. All in all, separation upon detection
reinforces the eﬀect on unemployment of a change in the audit rate, p.
The results in proposition 3 regarding the audit rate are consequently
reinforced by having matches dissolved upon detection. Changes in α or δ
and z or t will work through the same channels as in the basic model (see
proposition 3)
3.3 Including ﬁrm income taxes
Until now, we have exclusively focused on taxation of labor income in a
setting in which both ﬁrms and workers are liable to pay tax on labor. In
reality, of course, ﬁrms pay other taxes. Most of the other taxes paid and
subsidies received by ﬁrms we can safely ignore here, but there is one good
reason for taking a brief look at the taxation of ﬁrm income (such as by
means of the corporate income tax). This is the fact that when a ﬁrm agrees
with a worker to have part of the remuneration of labor be paid out as
unoﬃcial wage, then this part cannot be deducted from the ﬁrm’s revenue
in computing its taxable income. So while the ﬁrm may gain from avoiding
pay-roll taxation, ceteris paribus it will lose by experiencing an increase in its
taxable income, leading to a higher company tax. This eﬀect can be avoided,
if in addition to evasion of pay-roll taxation the ﬁrm can also evade income
taxation through under-reporting of revenues.
Against these observations we now extend our framework to incorporate
income taxation of the ﬁrm and a mechanism for evading this tax, too. To
begin with, only the ﬁrm side of the model is aﬀected.
We use the following notation. y still denotes true revenue of the ﬁrm,
while yo is the oﬃcial part of it, as appearing on the ﬁrm’s tax return.
T h ec o m p a n yi n c o m et a xi sl e v i e da tt h er a t ex,a n dp a y - r o l lt a xa sw e l l
19as the oﬃcial wage can be deducted from the income tax base. Declared
taxable income thus is yo − wo(1 + z), while true taxable income instead is
y − wo(1 + z) − we(1 + z).
The diﬀerence between true and oﬃcial taxable income hence is y −yo −
we(1+z). From this expression we easily see that paying out unoﬃcial income
directly entails an increase in taxable income of we(1 + z),a n dt h a tal o w e r
value of oﬃcial (yo)t h a nt r u e( y) revenue brings down taxable income.
We assume that the ﬁrm has an opportunity, coming at a cost, to evade
income tax, and that such evasion is detected at the same probability as
evasion of pay-roll or labor income taxation. In other words, if and only if
a ﬁrm-worker pair is inspected will authorities learn about both company
income and wage tax evasion. We also assume that ﬁn e sa sw e l la sc o s t so f
evasion are a function of evaded income, or y−yo−we(1+z).T h a ti s ,g i v e n
that the ﬁrm already evades pay-roll tax and pays out an unoﬃcial wage
component, it can for free reduce its income by the amount we(1 + z)(i.e.
without incurring ﬁnes or costs of evasion).19
It is clear by now that the ﬁrm’s decision as to oﬃcial revenue hinges
on the size of the unoﬃcial wage it pays to the worker. Vice versa, the
willingness of the ﬁrm to pay out unoﬃcial and oﬃcial wage components
might depend on the size of the oﬃcial revenue on its income tax return. How
these interdependencies work themselves out is determined by the timing of
t h ed e c i s i o n so nt h ep a r to ft h eﬁrm. Here, we shall assume that the ﬁrm
ﬁrst engages in bargaining with its worker about oﬃcial and unoﬃcial wage
components, and second, it ﬁl l so u ti t si n c o m et a xr e t u r n .
At the point where the ﬁrm computes its oﬃcial taxable income, wo and
we are then already given. With a ﬁne of ξ p e ru n i to fi n c o m ee v a d e df r o m
19An example may clarify this. Suppose the ﬁrm pays 40 in oﬃcial wage and likewise
40 in unoﬃcial wage. The payroll tax is 25 pct. With these numbers, paying 40 in
unoﬃcial rather than oﬃcial wage implies that the deduction for wages in the ﬁrm’s
income statement is reduced by 50. If its true revenue is 300, then declaring an oﬃcial
revenue of 250 will imply no evasion of income tax, as the oﬃcial income of 200 (250-50)
corresponds to true income (300-100). On the other hand, if the ﬁrm only declares a
revenue of 200, then evaded income amounts to 50, and if detected the ﬁrm will have to
pay a ﬁne accordingly.
20tax and a cost of evasion of H(y − yo − we(1 + z)) where H0 (.), H00 (.) > 0
(for positive arguments of the functions), H (0) = H0 (0) = 0,t h ei n c o m eo f
the ﬁrm net of taxes, expected ﬁnes, and costs of evasion can be written as
[y − (w
o + w




+ x(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)) − pξ(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)) − H(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)).
The ﬁrst term denotes its true net of tax income in the absence of all tax
evasion. The next three terms stands for tax savings, expected ﬁnes and
costs of evasion associated with pay-roll tax, while the ﬁnal three terms are
the parallel items for the company income tax.
Deciding on the optimum amount of income tax evasion is then tanta-
mount to ﬁnding the yo which maximizes the net value of the latter three
terms. The ﬁrst order condition yields
x = pξ + H
0(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)). (17)
T h em a r g i n a lt a xs a v i n gh a st oe q u a lt h es u mo ft h em a r g i n a le x p e c t e dﬁne
and the marginal cost of evasion. An interior solution with y−yo−we(1+z) >
0 is guaranteed with x>p ξ , which we assume holds. This expression nails
down the amount of income tax evasion as
y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)=( H
0)
−1(x − pξ) (18)
or the amount of oﬃcial revenue as in,
y
o = y − w
e(1 + z)) − (H
0)
−1(x − pξ). (19)
T h eg r e a t e ri st h eu n o ﬃcial wage or the pay-roll tax, the lower is declared
revenue. Moreover, the higher is the income tax rate, and the lower is the
likelihood of detection, the lower is declared revenue.
The most important relationship here is the ﬁrst one, i.e. between the un-
oﬃcial wage component and declared income and thus net income. Utilizing
income tax evasion opportunities and properly compensating in declared in-




e(1 + z)) − pξ(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z)) − H(y − y
o − w
e(1 + z))
21=( x − pξ)(H
0)
−1(x − pξ) − H((H
0)
−1(x − pξ)) ≡ K(x − pξ).
In this expression, K(x−pξ) stands for the net gains from exploiting income
tax evasion opportunities. The term K(x − pξ) is the income tax evasion
counterpart to the wage tax evasion term ϕ in the basic model, and K(.) is
positive due to the properties of the concealment cost function.20
With this information we can now turn to wage bargaining. The ﬂow













Compared to the basic model, the equation takes into account that the ﬁrm
pays income tax, but can proﬁt from evasion of same tax. The ﬂow equation
for vacancies is still (5).
Going through the same steps as in section 2 we can derive new versions
of equations (6) and (7) which nail down the oﬃcial and the unoﬃcial wage.
We ﬁnd that we is implicitly determined by:
(1 + z)(1 − x)
1 − t
=
1 − x(1 + z)+pα + G0(we)
1 − pδ − C0(we)
(21)
where the left hand side is the slightly modiﬁed oﬃcial tax wedge, ˜ φo,a n d
the right hand side is the slightly modiﬁed punishment wedge, ˜ φe.T h e
numerators on both sides of the equation contain the common term −x(1+z)
featuring the company income tax rate x. The interesting question is whether
taking account of ﬁrm income taxation will raise or lower the amount of wage
which is not declared to authorities. It turns out that both directions are
possibilities. To see this, partially diﬀerentiate ˜ φo − ˜ φe =0in (21) with
respect to x and we. The result is
Proposition 5 The unoﬃcial wage component we increases (decreases, stays
constant) upon the introduction of the company income tax, if z−pα−G0(we)
in the no-company-tax situation is positive (negative, zero).
20H0 >H / (y−yo−we (1 + z)). K(x−pξ)=0only when there is no income tax evasion,
i.e., when x − pξ ≤ 0.
22Proof Diﬀerentiate (21) with respect to we and x.
Going back to section 2, the condition in the proposition is equivalent to
the numerator of φo being greater than the numerator of φe(we).( T h et w ot a x
factors have to be equal, but their numerators can have any relationship.) In
a loose sense, z−pα−G0(we) being positive implies that it is relatively more
attractive for the ﬁrm than for the worker to evade labor tax. Accordingly,
if the ﬁrm is a more eﬀective tax evader than is the worker, then introducing
company income taxation leads to more extensive evasion of wage taxation.
The proposition connects wage tax evasion to company taxation. Simi-
larly, it is possible to relate total labor costs, tightness and unemployment
to the company tax and also to the opportunities to evade this tax. Similar
steps as those leading to equation (9) can be used to derive total producer
costs.21 Using the expression for total producer costs and (20) and (5) under




=( 1− β)y(1 − x) − βkθ+( 1− β)(K(x − pξ)+˜ ϕ). (22)
where ˜ ϕ = ˜ φowe (1 − pδ)−˜ φoC−we (1 + pα)−G+we (1 + z)x ≥ 0. ˜ ϕ is pos-
i t i v ed u et ot h ep r o p e r t i e so ft h ec o n c e a l m e n tc o s tf u n c t i o n sa n d∂ ˜ ϕ/∂we =0
due to the envolope property as discussed in the basic model. Unemployment
is still given by (1).
The company income tax aﬀects tightness and thereby unemployment in
three diﬀerent ways. First, as a direct consequence of the tax, ﬁrm proﬁts fall
which reduces tightness and increases unemployment. Second, an increased
taxation of company income increases the net gain of income tax evasion
which instead induces more ﬁrms to enter the market. This tends to increase
tightness and reduce unemployment. However, obviously the former eﬀect
must dominate this latter eﬀect, as the gain from evading income tax can
never exceed taxation of the ﬁrm’s revenue. Third, the tax rate aﬀects the
gains that can be made by evading wage payments. An increase in x reduces
21Total producer costs are given by wo (1 + z)(1− x)+we (1 + pα − (1 + z)x)+G =
β (y + kθ)(1− x)+βK(x − pξ) − (1 − β)˜ ϕ.
23the tax and punishment wedges, which reduces the gains from wage tax
evasion. This eﬀect thus increases wage demands which reduces tightness
a n de m p l o y m e n t .W ec a nt h u sc o n c l u d et h a t
Proposition 6 An increase in the company income tax rate reduces tightness
and increases unemployment.
Proof Diﬀerentiating (22) yields ∂θ/∂x < 0. Diﬀerentiating (1) yields
∂u/∂x > 0.
An alternative to the analysis above is to assume that when the ﬁrm
is inactive, it can deduct the vacancy cost k f r o mt h ei n c o m et a x ,o rr a t h e r
e n j o yat a xr e b a t eo fxk.T ot a k et h i si n t oa c c o u n tw ew r i t et h eﬂow equation
for an inactive ﬁrm as rV = −k(1 − x)+q(J − V ). Two additional eﬀects
on tightness and unemployment of a higher income tax rate emerge. First, an
increase in x reduces the per period vacancy cost which induces more ﬁrms
to enter. Second, an increase in x reduces the surplus of the match due to
saved vacancy costs. This causes wage moderation and more ﬁrms to enter.
Both eﬀects increase tightness and reduce unemployment, thus working in
the opposite direction to the eﬀects in proposition 6.
It is straightforward to verify that propositions 1 to 3 hold even in the
presence of a company income tax. This can be shown proceeding along the
lines of the proofs of the three propositions. Accordingly, lighter taxation of
l a b o ro rs t r o n g e rt a xe n f o r c e m e n tw i l lr a i s eu n e m p l o y m e n t ,e v e ni fﬁrms also
pay tax on company income. Interestingly, an increase in p will now have an
additional negative impact on tightness and employment. The reason is that
an increase in p also punishes ﬁr m sb ym a k i n gc o m p a n yi n c o m et a xe v a s i o n
less attractive. Recall that any income tax evasion by ﬁr m si sd e t e c t e da l o n g
with the evasion of labour taxes. This will have a direct negative eﬀect on
the attractiveness for ﬁrms to enter which consequently reduces tightness and
thereby increases unemployment.
244 Conclusions
Much of tax evasion in modern-day industrialized countries, especially within
certain service sectors, takes the form of ﬁrms and workers agreeing on under-
r e p o r t i n gt h ew a g e sp a i dt ow o r k e r s . T h i sw a y ,ﬁrms save on payroll taxes
and workers save on personal income taxes. Suspecting such under-reporting
of wages, tax authorities may decide to audit ﬁrms closely, and if they detect
irregularities they can impose ﬁn e so na tl e a s to n eo ft h et w op a r t i e s . T h e
interesting question then is how the scope for tax evasion through under-
reporting of wages will aﬀect the remuneration of workers, producer costs,
and the performance of the labor market.
In this paper we have set up a labor market model exactly to asses the
eﬀects of tax rates and enforcement of taxation on the level of wages and
the rate of unemployment. We found that tighter auditing on the part of
authorities would lead to higher producer costs and more unemployment.
Conversely, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we at the same time derived
that higher wage taxes (on payrolls or personal incomes) would lead to lower
unemployment. The main mechanism responsible for this result is that higher
tax rates make tax evasion more attractive and rewarding. And as evasion
is available only to employed workers, higher wage taxes increases the value
of having a job which restrains wage demands.
Our examination of several extensions of the basic model revealed that
t h em a i nr e s u l t sc o n c e r n i n gt h er e l a t i onship between tax rates and enforce-
ment parameters on one hand and unemployment and labor costs on the
other, carry over to diﬀerent settings, where detection of tax evasion leads
to the cessation of the worker-ﬁrm relationship; where unemployed workers
receive unemployment beneﬁts; or where ﬁrms in addition to payroll taxes
pay regular income taxes.
The framework we have set up can be fruitfully applied to study further
questions related to taxation and enforcement of taxation. One interesting
issue, already touched upon in the paper, is the incidence of taxes, enforce-
ment, and social security transfers in the labor market, i.e. the degree to
which the worker (ﬁrm) carries the burden of higher taxes, more stringent
25enforcement, or cuts in unemployment insurance. Another topic is the wel-
fare consequences of enhanced use of tax and enforcement instruments. A
study of this latter topic will be complicated by the fact that ineﬃciences
related to resource use in inspections or behavioral distortions may interfere
with search ineﬃciencies inherent in a labor market characterized by frictions
in the matching of workers and ﬁrms. Nevertheless, we plan to investigate
these issues in future work.
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